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RHA Definition and Consideration Hazard Analysis
Mission Timeline and Deliverables
Drivers for a new approach 
and Future Considerations
Emerging Technologies and 
COTS parts usage increasing
Varied Missions – National Assets to CubeSats 
RHA consists of all activities undertaken to ensure that the electronics
and materials of a space system perform to their design specifications
after exposure to the mission space environment.
The subset of interests for NEPP and the REAG, are EEE parts. It is
important to register that all of these undertakings are in a feedback
loop and require constant iteration and updating throughout the
mission life. More detail can be found in the reference materials on
applicable test data for usage on parts.
Acronyms
Heavily Relied Upon Documentation for RHA
Often Utilized Tools
Acknowledgements
• NASA Documents
Guidelines and Lessons Learned found on radhome
• Military Performance Specifications
19500, 38510, 38534, 38535
• Military Handbooks
814,815,816,817,339
• Military Test Methods
MIL-STD-750, MIL-STD-883
• DTRA Documents
DNA-H-93-52, DNA-H-95-61, DNA-H-93-140
• ASTM Standards By Subcommittee 
F1.11, E10.07, E13.09
• EIA/JEDEC Test Methods and Guides
JESD57, JESD89, JEP133, FOTP-64
• ESA Test Methods and Guides
ESA/SCC No. 22900 and 25100, ESA PSS-01-609
Define the Hazard
Reference Materials
• Radiation Databases
GSFC radhome, JPL radcentral, ESA escies
• Environment Modeling
SPENVIS, CRÈME, OMERE, NOVICE
• Radiation effects in devices/materials
CRÈME, MRED, GEANT, SRIM, MULASSIS
Evaluate the Hazard
RequirementsDefine the Radiation Requirements
Evaluate the Design
Parts’ Response System Impact
• Risk Tolerant vs. Risk Avoidance
• Low budget, shortened schedule
• Short mission duration 
• High data rates
• On board processing 
• Multi-instrument dependent datasets
• Data continuity from one satellite to the next
External Environment Transport through Materials
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Evaluate the Operational Requirements
Requirements need to be written and incorporated into mission documents
such that they are able to flow down from mission level to subsystem and then
to the parts selection. These requirements are determined from the hazard
definition and evaluation.
The requirements need to be understood in the context of mission success and then
updated and applied such that meeting those requirements provides assurance to a
working system in the intended environment. This is iterated throughout mission
design lifecycle to build a set of requirements that are useful, driving cost and
schedule.
Risk Classification and Tracking
SEL/ SEGR/ SEB: Parts that are susceptible to these types of failures are strongly suggested for test, a
waiver would have to depend on redundancy that would allow for failures during the mission lifetime.
For FETs there is a need to verify application gate voltage. Testing is required if application gate voltage
is below -5V. If above this, a waiver may be able to justify the parts usage.
SEU: In all cases, verifying that the EDAC used on the instrument can handle the rate, or verification that
the Single Event Rate (SER) will not affect the mission, will remove risk of the system level.
SET: All listed parts suggested for test will exhibit SET of some magnitude. Risk to the circuit from SET can
be resolved by analyzing the affect of the worst case SET on the circuit for each instance of the part.
Filtering and/or circuit design that follows can be used to warrant the effect of the transient as
negligible.
SEFI: In all cases, verifying that the EDAC used on the instrument can handle the rate, or verification that
the Single Event Rate (SER) will not affect the mission, will remove risk of the system level.
TID/ELDRS: Parts are very susceptible to gain degradation, especially when operated at low current, so
verification that the gain requirements of the circuit can be met by the worst case data. ELDRS
robustness is determined by an RLAT from the manufacturer. These data must to provided for
verification of lot hardness to fully approve the part. Alternatively, an LDR RLAT can be performed on
these devices. In other words a waiver could use the worst case data if it exists to approve the parts.
DD: Parts are very susceptible to gain degradation, especially when operated at low current, so
verification that the gain requirements of the circuit can be met by the worst case data. Robustness is
determined by an RLAT from the manufacturer. These data must to provided for verification of lot
hardness to fully approve the part. Alternatively, an RLAT displacement damage test can be performed
on these devices. In other words a waiver could use the worst case data if it exists to approve the parts.
Applicable Parts Data 
(The good stuff is hard to find)
• System on a chip solutions, COTS parts are 
meeting complex needs
• Highly coveted performance
• 3D structures
• Complex radiation response
• Experimentation cannot cover state space
Parameters going into a SEE test on power 
MOSFETs 
Know your facility through dosimetry in 
order to understand results, choose the 
right facility based on the physics of 
failure. 
Protons: soft parts with low LET upsets / 
displacement damage / small sensitive 
areas
Electrons: charging / electron rich 
environments
Heavy Ions: sufficient range? Appropriate 
flux?
Gamma Rays / X-rays: TID / appropriate 
dose rate?
Probability of TID failures increase over mission life, SEE 
probability is uniform
Transients shown with statistics can help 
designers what to expect and mitigate 
Design Mitigation
3D Ray Trace can 
give localized dose 
through spacecraft 
shielding
Degraded proton beam energies
Know the test facility
Know your parts
o During the Proposal/Feasibility Phase
• Draft Environment definition
• Draft Hardness assurance requirement
• Preliminary studies
o At the Preliminary Design Review (PDR)
• Final Environment definition
• Electronic design approach
• Preliminary spacecraft layout for shielding 
analysis
• Preliminary shielding analysis
• Final Hardness assurance requirement 
definition
o At the Critical Design Review (CDR)
• Radiation test results
• Final shielding analysis
• Circuit design analysis results
o After CDR
• Remaining Radiation Lot Acceptance tests
• Approved As Built Parts Lists
o After Launch
• Failure Analysis
• Anomaly Root Cause
What failure mechanisms are 
dominant? How do you 
interrogate the part with the 
flight application in mind? 
What are the corner cases?
Depending on hazard and 
requirement assessments, parts 
testing may be necessary.
Comprehend the results
Know when and how to apply 
the results from an applicable 
radiation test.  Utilize the 
information from the hazard 
analysis to evaluate the 
hazard from the part level up 
to the system.
Evaluate Hazard
Evaluate Design
Proton upsets in the South Atlantic Anomaly
Risks Called out by part and available data
Extended response of device upsets when run through system 
configuration
Documentation of the risks and available data on
the part are kept with the official parts
identification lists, the as designed lists, and finally
the as built lists to incorporate changes in the
design as it matures. Risk classification helps with
trade studies on whether or not the system
requirements are being met and where testing can
buy down risk to the project.
Capturing the system impact of radiation device
responses is tied into the verification of requirements
and system performance. If only looked at from the
piece part level these types of effects could impact
availability, critical functions, or mission success.
• Filter Transients on Analog 
outputs
• Derate power devices to be used 
in a safe operating area
• Spot shielding of devices to bring 
down local TID
• Refresh / reset rates of parts
• Current Limiting
• Supply Balancing
• Triplication or complex logic 
architecture tailoring
NASA 7120.5
3D Three Dimensional
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
CDR Critical Design Review
COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf
CREME Cosmic Ray Effects on Micro-Electronics
DD Displacement Damage
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EEE Electrical, Electronic andd Electromechanical
EIA Electronic Industries Alliance
ELDRS Enhanced Low Dose Rate Sensitive
ESA European Space Agency
ETW Electronics and Technology Workshop
FETs Field Effect Transistor
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center
JEDEC Joint Electron Device Engineering Council
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory
LET Linear Energy Transfer
MOSFETs Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect Transistor
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NEPP NASAS Electronics Parts and Packaging
PDR Preliminary Design Review
REAG Radiation Effects and Analysis Group
RHA Radiation Hardness Assurance
RLAT Radiation Lot Acceptance Testing
SCC Space Components Coordination Group
SEB Single Event Burnout
SEE Single Event Effects
SEFI Single Event Functional Interrupt
SEGR Single Event Gate Rupture
SEL Single Event Latchup
SER Single Event Rate
SET Single Event Transient
SEU Single Event Upset
TID Total Ionizing Dose
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20160009305 2019-08-31T02:16:32+00:00Z
